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Kwame Nkrumah invokes the doctrine of emergentism in the hope of reconciling theism - 
a tenacious part of the African worldview - with materialism. However, in this article I 
seek to show that this reconciliation is not only ultimately unsuccessful, but is actually 
impossible. Towards this end, I identify weaknesses in what I call the six argumentative 
pillars of Nkrumah’s theory of emergentism (which he calls “philosophical materialism”), 
namely, his arguments regarding the origin of the cosmic material, the primary reality of 
matter, idealism, categorial convertibility, dialectic change, and the self-motion of matter. 
The article should provide not only alternative perspectives to Nkrumah’s metaphysics, 
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Introduction 
Like Leopold Senghor, Julius Nyerere, Nnamdi Azikiwe and other nationalists/ideologists 
of his time and milieu in charge of constructing a philosophical basis for the emancipation 
of Africa, Kwame Nkrumah felt it necessary to anchor is socialism on a metaphysical 
foundation, which would be the basis of the policies that would be contained in such a 
socio-economic system. In particular, Nkrumah identifi s three influences in Africa, 
which, according to him, beg for some sort of reconciliation in the “African conscience”. 
They are the traditional, the Western and the Islamic, and they co-exist uneasily 
(Nkrumah 1964, 78). Nkrumah proposes what he calls “consciencism”, which he 
describes as “the map in intellectual terms of the disposition of forces which will enable 
African society to digest the Western and the Islamic and the Euro-Christian elements in 
Africa, and develop them in such a way that they fit into the African personality.” It is a 
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“philosophical standpoint which, taking its start from the present content of the African 
conscience, indicates the way in which progress is forged out of the conflict in the 
conscience” (Nkrumah 1964, 79). 
 
How does Nkrumah set out to reconcile these influences and to forge a way forward for 
this crisis-ridden conscience? To be sure, this way forward must involve proposing a new 
kind of metaphysical foundation. To this end, the rest of Nkrumah’s famous book 
Consciencism shows that his way forward is nothing other than scientific socialism; and 
the metaphysics he proposes he calls philosophical materialism. According to him, 
“Socialism depends on dialectical and historical materi lism, upon the view that there is 
only one nature subject in all its manifestations to natural laws and that human society is, 
in this sense, part of nature and subject to its own la s of development” (Nkrumah 1973, 
83). He therefore proposed his view of the basic cosmological and ontological questions 
that have plagued philosophers since ancient times. These questions border on issues such 
as the origin of the cosmic material, idealism, materi lism, as well as matter and its 
properties. Nkrumah’s metaphysics can be found in the first chapter of his book. 
Although he calls his metaphysics “philosophical materi lism”, upon examination it turns 
out to be the doctrine of weak emergentism - the philosophical view that higher-level 
properties of the universe such as consciousness or pirit, arose from lower-level 
properties such as matter, so that the lower-level properties are the originating material of 
the universe. The details of this theory are explicated later in this article. 
 
Nkrumah’s metaphysical theory arises from practical onsiderations. At heart he is a 
Marxist materialist, but he does not want to be dismis ed by Africans as an atheist. Citing 
Drake (1977), John McClendon reports: 
The eminent Africanist and anthropologist, St. Clair Drake, who served as 
the chair of sociology at the University of Ghana from 1959-61, reports on 
a conversation he had with Nkrumah about atheism and materialism. In 
that conversation, Nkrumah voices his trepidation for materialism 
grounded in nineteenth century positivism. Nkrumah declares the reason 
he does not accept atheism as the logical outcome of materialism is 
because “[n]o Africans are going to be atheists” (McClendon 2012, 48). 
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Thus Nkrumah proposes a materialist doctrine that accommodates theism, but which 
gives superiority as well as self-motion and initiative to matter. He begins his 
metaphysics by asserting that the origin of the basic cosmic material must be from within 
the cosmic material itself or its product (Nkrumah 1964, 8). To affirm an outside cause 
would be to affirm the Principle of Sufficient Reason or open up an infinite regress about 
the cause of the cause of the cause of the basic comi  material without end. Nkrumah 
goes further to reject idealism as contradictory and suffering from what he calls the God-
complex (Nkrumah 1964, 19). He adopts materialism by arguing that matter is 
independent, self-caused and self-moved, and can give rise to other categories such as 
spirit and consciousness through what he calls “categorial conversion” involving 
dialectics and discontinuity (Nkrumah 1964, 19-23). 
 
As we shall explain below, for Nkrumah the dialectical movement involved in the 
categorial conversion represents a discontinuity in the sense that matter can give rise to 
something entirely different, such as spirit. In this process, old set properties are dropped 
and new ones are acquired (Nkrumah 1964, 25). By this same categorial conversion, 
capitalism can give rise to socialism in what Nkrumah calls dialectical materialism 
(Nkrumah 1964, 75). This is his adaptation of Marxism to propagating socialism in 
Africa. This I will call Nkrumah’s metaphysics, and it has six argumentative pillars, 
namely, the origin of the cosmic material, the primary reality of matter, idealism, 
categorial convertibility, dialectic change, and the self-motion of matter. In this article, I 
will explore each of these pillar arguments of Nkrumah’s metaphysical grounding of 
“African socialism”. Consequently, the article is divi ed into sections discussing each of 
these pillars. My critique will show that apart from the fact that Nkrumah’s materialism is 
metaphysically inconsistent with the African traditional metaphysical worldview, his 
attempts to reconcile this inconsistency by reconciling materialism with theism produces 
logical, and in some cases, epistemological problems. Although there has been much 
debate about Nkrumah’s political and metaphysical positions, I am yet to see a detailed 
critique of Nkrumah on these six argumentative pillars taken together, and so I set out to 
offer one. 
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The significance of the article arises from the fact that deep contradictions are beginning 
to emerge from classical capitalism after centuries of practice by Western countries. Chief 
among these contradictions is growth by increasing d sequilibrium, in which more of the 
world is increasingly being owned by less. Thomson Reuters reports that the richest 1 
percent of the world owned roughly 46 percent of its wealth in 2013, and 50 percent of its 
wealth in 2014 (Reuters 2013; 2014), a quite frightening progression. Similarly, the 
economist Joseph Stiglitz (2011) observed that 1 percent of the United States not just 
commands about 40 percent of the national product, but also increasingly holds power. 
Similar pictures of inequality abound in most other nations (See Credit Suisse 2013; 
Domhoff 2013, par 27 and table 5; Guest 2014). There is an emerging concern in most 
countries that some sort of socialism/re-distribution is required, and this concern is 
becoming a global consensus. However, the difficult q estion for most countries is: what 
kind or adaptation of socialism? Given that European socialist ideas have traditionally 
thrived on materialist metaphysics, and metaphysical materialism does not exactly align 
with traditional African metaphysical worldviews, the metaphysical adaptations of 
socialism for African countries is also crucial to determining their indigenous adaptations 
of the theory in governance and daily life. Nkrumah offers the most comprehensive 
metaphysical foundation for socialism on the African scene. It seems therefore most 
appropriate to begin the debate from his ideas. 
 
The Origin of Cosmic Material 
According to Nkrumah, metaphysics addresses two basic questions. The first is that of 
what there is, that is, the basic types of objects in the world. Nkrumah observes that 
Thales had argued that it is water, while Berkeley had argued that it is spirit/idea. The 
second basic metaphysical question for Nkrumah pertains to the origin of the cosmic 
material (the material that constitutes everything in the world). Has the cosmic material a 
cause? For him, the difficulty of ascertaining a cause points to the persistent problems 
associated with it (Nkrumah 1964, 7). 
 
To be specific, Nkrumah asserts that any cause of the basic cosmic material must be from 
the raw material or its product. Outside this for him, any insistence on a cause will open 
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up an infinite regress about the cause of the cause of the cosmic material, - and so on. 
This is in spite of the fact that to claim that there is no cause of the cosmic raw material is 
to claim an exception to the Principle of Sufficient Reason. In narrowing down the origin, 
Nkrumah writes: “To say that the cause of the cosmic aterial is the cosmic raw material 
is to say that it is self-caused. And since to say th t something is self-caused is to say that 
that thing has no cause at all, then the cause of the cosmic material must come from its 
product” (Nkrumah 1964, 8). However, this, in my view, raises problems of consistency, 
since the existence of something’s product is posteri r or subsequent to the existence of 
that thing. How could the product of an entity, whose existence subsists on the existence 
of the entity, become the cause of the existence of the entity? Let me, however, continue 
with Nkrumah’s argument. 
 
According to Nkrumah, theology sees the origin of the cosmic material as a transcendent 
force. So adopting a Theist or Deist position is to locate the origin of cosmic material 
outside the world and affirm the Principle of Sufficient Reason; and to negate the 
Principle of Sufficient Reason (to deny an outside-th -world origin of the cosmic 
material) is atheist. For this reason, Nkrumah concludes that: “pantheism is atheism using 
theological language” (Nkrumah 1964, 9). Here, we se that Nkrumah sees pantheism as 
atheistic because it conceives God as identical with matter, and thus suggests that matter 
is the sole reality. As we shall see, Nkrumah rejects the sole reality of matter because he 
thinks it gives no allowance for recognizing other categories of being such as spirit and 
consciousness, to the extent that they can be conceived of as distinct from matter. All of 
this is understandable given Nkrumah’s attempt to reconcile his materialism with theism 
in order to avoid the charge of atheism. 
 
Nkrumah considers the other aspect of the second basic metaphysical question as being 
concerned with the extent of cosmic material. Here, he considers whether it is finite or 
infinite. He says here that the driving (or popular) interest is that the world should be 
permanent and some people think that at any point in time, something must always exist. 
“But the desire for permanence,” argued Nkrumah, “is not enough to infer the existence 
of God” (Nkrumah 1964, 9). 
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In addition, Nkrumah argues that the cyclic notion of the universe is disproved by time 
and finitude. He rejects the notion of the infinite presence of the universe as an argument 
for permanence, saying that a universe that has existed nfinitely backwards in time can 
cease to exist without its infinitude suffering decrease, because it would be comparable to 
a cut at any point in the series of negative integers. What is more, a universe that is 
infinite in space can cease to exist without prejudice to its size (Nkrumah 1964, 10). In 
fact, for Nkrumah, the finitude or infinitude of the world are all conceptions that cannot 
be verified, because the verification has to be carried out by someone who is outside the 
world. Even to say that the world has a cause is tojudge the world from outside it. Yet 
this is not possible, so there are “no material grounds for inferring the caused, uncaused, 
finite or infinite nature of the world” (Nkrumah 1964, 11). If this were so, why then 
would Nkrumah postulate a causal theory of the basic cosmic material? 
 
Nkrumah argues that postulating a cause for “what tere is” is to commit to a conception 
of the “inside” and “outside” of the world. He mentions that an example of this inside-
outside conception is Christianity, where God came into the world from outside through 
Adam by means of living breath, and later through Jesus Christ by means of mystic 
incarnation. Nkrumah then expresses his disagreement with this conception: 
… this ‘inside’ ‘outside’ conception becomes a contradiction when one’s 
gaze is so steadfast on the ‘outside’ that the realities of the ‘inside’ suffer 
neglect. This is why Marx criticized religion as an exploitative tool which 
was used to divert the workers’ attention to ‘outside’ concerns and 
overlook the value of their labour (Nkrumah 1964, 12). 
 
Nkrumah contends that many African societies forestalled this kind of “inside” “outside” 
perversion by making the inside world continuous with the outside world in such a way 
that heaven was not outside the world but inside it. He adds: 
… in present day Africa, recognizing this ‘inside’ ‘outside’ dialectic is 
necessary in order to anticipate and tackle colonialist nd imperialist 
advances which might use religious guises for political gains. This also is 
why it is necessary that religion must be separated from politics and the 
state must be secular. But this is not to be interpreted as a declaration of 
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political war on religion, for religion is a social fact that cannot be wished 
away (Nkrumah 1964, 13). 
 
Nkrumah does not dismiss religion as a “social fact” in Africa, but he is quick to point out 
what he sees as its pitfalls. According to him, there is a sociological connection between 
religion/religious practice and poverty. It has its main root in the social depression of 
workers, as can be confirmed in Africa, Latin America, Asia, the Caribbean, and among 
Afro-Americans (Nkrumah 1964, 13-14). In his words, “the same terrifying pauperism 
arising from pre-technical society and capitalism which metes out prostitution, 
destruction, ruin and death from starvation and exploitation also creates the religious 
feeling” (Nkrumah 1964, 14). He attacks religion as an obstacle to true socialism and 
evidence of the depression of workers. 
 
At this point we ask: why must the cause of the cosmic raw material come from either 
itself or its products? Why will its cause not come from outside it? Read Nkrumah: 
“According to the hypothesis that what we seek to explain is the basic raw material, any 
proposed cause for it can only itself arise from the basic raw material. Therefore it must 
either be part of the basic raw material or be a product of it” (Nkrumah 1964, 7-8). 
Nkrumah himself made the italicization of the word “basic” in two of its three 
appearances in this quotation. The weight he placed on this emphasis is suggestive of his 
view that this (basic raw material) is the crucible of all existence. It suggests that the bare 
fact that we are discussing the basic cosmic material is sufficient ground for theinf rence 
that its cause must be a part of it. There is a materialist assumption here, and this is that 
there is no ground to determine if anything outside th  physical universe exists. As a 
result of this assumption, the possibility of an out- f-the-world cause for the basic cosmic 
material is not possible. Here we appreciate Nkrumah’s Marxist-Leninist leaning which 
places matter at the peak of existence and subjugates everything else, spirit included, to it. 
 
There are two possible implications of Nkrumah’s materi lism. The first is atheism, while 
the second is a logically inconsistent and self-extinguishing kind of theism - a theism that 
subjects spirit to matter and makes matter existentially prior to spirit. Let us consider the 
first implication, the atheistic one. Nkrumah’s denial of the existence of anything outside 
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the world amounts to atheism, since it implies thatGod, who is ordinarily understood to 
be capable of existing beyond the world, does not exist. However, Nkrumah’s refusal to 
be categorical with this position speaks of his desire to veil his atheism behind a 
philosophy that he hopes will palliate the typically religious African mind. This can be 
seen in his denial of what he calls the “sole reality of matter” in preference for the 
“primary reality of matter”. To this I will return. Let me recall the following demarcation 
made by Engels: 
Which is primary, spirit or nature …? “Did God creat  the world or has the 
world been in existence eternally?” The answers which the philosophers 
gave to this question split them into two great camps. Those who asserted 
the primacy of spirit to nature and, therefore, in the last instance, assumed 
world creation in some form or the other … comprised the camp of 
idealism. The others, who regarded nature as primary, belong to the 
various schools of materialism (Engels 1967[1941], 2 ).
 
For Engels, those who uphold the primacy of matter imply that the world has in fact 
existed eternally, so that it was not created. To say that the world was never created 
would obviously imply that even if God existed, he did not create it. Unless additional 
clarification is provided, Nkrumah’s position has the same implications outlined above 
(matter is primary, the world has existed eternally, the world was never created, and 
therefore God did not create the world). Furthermore, if we go by our common sense 
understanding of God as the being who created the world, or “Creator” as one of the 
attributes of God, then the existence of God will not be compatible with materialism. 
Thus from this early metaphysical discussion about the origin of the cosmic raw material, 
we begin to see the atheism implicit in or readable from Nkrumah’s philosophical system, 
in spite of his avowals to the contrary.  
 
The Primary Reality of Matter 
Let me examine the second implication of Nkrumah’s materialism: the primacy of matter 
implies a theism that is both uncomfortable and logically inconsistent. Nkrumah held that 
it is a materialist philosophy to assert the sole or primary reality of matter. He had 
distinguished between the sole reality of matter and the primary reality of matter. By 
“sole reality of matter”, he meant that matter is the only existing entity. However, 
10 Emmanuel Ifeanyi Ani 
 
considering his sensitivity to the concerns of a religious society, he chooses to avoid this 
position. Instead, he chooses to affirm the primary reality of matter. According to him, the 
assertion of the sole reality of matter is atheistic, but philosophical consciencism, the 
social and political theory that springs from dialectical materialism, though deeply rooted 
in materialism, is not necessarily atheistic (Nkrumah 1964, 84). In his words, “Philosophy 
prepares itself for the accommodation of hard facts by asserting not the crude sole reality 
of matter, but its primary reality. Other categories must then be shown to be able to arise 
from matter through process” (Nkrumah 1964, 21). 
 
Nkrumah remarked that a materialist philosophy which accepts the primary reality of 
matter must either deny other categories of being or claim that they are reducible without 
leftovers to matter. As such, if spirit is accepted as a category of being, non-residual 
reduction to matter must be claimed. Therefore, the p nomenon of consciousness, like 
that of self-consciousness, must be held to be in the ultimate analysis nothing but an 
aspect of matter (Nkrumah 1964, 84). So what we have here is the doctrine of matter as 
primary reality, and every other reality as secondary to matter. Nkrumah intends to allow 
for belief in consciousness and spirit, but simultaneously insists that matter has the edge 
in ontological priority. 
 
If Nkrumah thinks that he has reconciled the conflict between religion and materialism, 
then he is mistaken, since it remains to be seen how a belief in God can be tailored to the 
belief that God is the result of something else - a creature from matter. For instance, 
where does Nkrumah’s materialism leave the idea of theism that recognizes the primacy 
of spirit? Can the primary reality of matter accommodate theism? Should we now 
accommodate the primacy of matter into our present conception of theism: spirit is 
subject to matter? The doctrine of theism, any kind of theism, however, assumes the 
primacy of spirit. In this analysis, therefore, any kind of materialism (sole or primary 
reality of matter) is incompatible with theism. Thus when Nkrumah writes that it is 
materialism that gives the firmest conceptual basis to Consciencism, and elsewhere 
asserts that he is “a non-denominational Christian and a Marxist socialist and I have 
found no contradiction between the two” (Nkrumah 197 , 12) the inconsistency becomes 
obvious. 
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Nkrumah argues for the primacy of matter, but elsewhere he argues that matter is 
“coextensive with the universe” (Nkrumah 1964, 20). However, as John McClendon has 
pointed out, if matter is coextensive with the universe, it means that the universe and 
matter are one and the same, which in turn implies th  ole reality of matter. So, contrary 
to Nkrumah’s attempt to reconcile materialism with religion, this means that 
consciousness and spirit are mere piphenomena (see McClendon 2012, 46). This is 
precisely the position that Nkrumah seeks to avoid. For instance, he argues, “The 
dialectical materialist position must be distinguished from an epiphenomenalist one. For 
the former, mind is a development from matter; for the latter, it is merely something 
which accompanies the activity of matter” (Nkrumah 1964, 26). Nevertheless, can we 
locate any substantive difference between the primary and the sole reality of matter? How 
does consciousness and spirit fare under the primary re lity of matter, as opposed to the 
sole reality of matter? Nkrumah opts for the primary reality of matter so that 
consciousness and spirit can be said to exist as derivative categories; but this can also be 
said of the sole reality of matter: consciousness can exist as mere epiphenomena (side 
effects) of matter. 
 
It seems to me that the difference between the two the ries of matter must be in whether 
consciousness is reducible to matter, in terms of whether consciousness can be explained 
by going back to matter. I will term this explanatory reductionism. Nkrumah actually 
affirms the theory of reductionism when he advances it along with the theories of 
nominalism. He writes: “In reductionism, one sees how concepts proper to a derivative 
category can be reduced completely to concepts which are proper to a primary category” 
(Nkrumah 1964, 22; italics mine). When we say that consciousness not only arises from 
matter but can also be completely reduced to matter, then we posit, not just the prima y, 
but also the sole reality of matter. So if Nkrumah’s choice of the primary reality of matter 
is to accommodate theism, then both the choice itself and its objective are ultimately 
unsuccessful. 
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Is consciousness reducible by explanation to matter? This is a question left for science, 
rather than philosophy, to answer. Answering it means being able to predict 
consciousness as well as to replicate it using putative matter. It will not do to simply 
declare that consciousness is explainable by examining matter when this is not 
demonstrated in any way. 
 
Materialists (particularly weak emergentists) might point to the ability to reduce 
apparently complex phenomena such as the Internet ad economic systems to the 
connectivity between many computers and to unit economic transactions respectively, but 
these can by no means be in the same category of explanation as consciousness and spirit 
in terms of matter. These are imperfect analogies. In any case, analogies will not do: only 
demonstration will, since it seems impossible to find an analogy to human consciousness. 
 
Idealism 
Nkrumah begins his discourse of idealism by highlighting its problems and 
contradictions, and rejecting it. Nkrumah sees ideal sm as a philosophy that upholds the 
primary existence of the spirit and derives matter from the same, such as Gottfried 
Leibniz’s philosophy that sees matter as unconsciou spirit, or George Berkeley’s theory 
that sees the world as nothing but spirits and their knowledge (Nkrumah 1964, 15). 
 
Nkrumah identifies solipsism as a source of idealism, in which the individual starts from 
a depressing scepticism about the existence of other people and other things, as if his/her 
own body is not part and parcel of the entire world. As Nkrumah’s argument goes, the 
logical result of the individual’s general pessimis is to disincarnate himself/herself, and 
in this way his/her role as the centre of solipsism and the centre of experience wobbles: 
“He the subject, the sufferer and enjoyer of experience melts away, and we are left with 
unattached experience” (Nkrumah 1964, 16). According to Nkrumah’s narrative, 
Descartes thought that since he could think of himself without any part of his body like 
arm or leg, then he could think of himself entirely without a body. However, Nkrumah 
maintains, disincarnation is not a physical deformity. According to him, Descartes 
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proposed quite un-soberly to hang the whole universe on the existence of his body. 
However, he (Descartes) promptly admits that he cannot doubt that he is thinking: “… 
even if he doubted that he thought, he would still be thinking, as doubt was a form of 
thinking” (Nkrumah 1964, 16). It was necessary for him to single out what he could not 
coherently doubt in order to peg his existence on it; but here - and this is where Nkrumah 
accuses Descartes of solipsism - Nkrumah says that Descartes would be “understanding 
too much” if he thinks that Cogito ergo sum (“I think therefore I exist”) would imply that 
an object exists, let alone that Descartes exists (Nkrumah 1964, 17). He writes: 
All that is indubitable in the first section of Descartes’ statement is that 
there is thinking. The first person in that statement is no more than the 
subject of a verb, with no more connotation of an object than there is in the 
anticipatory “it” of the sentence “it is raining”. The pronoun in this 
sentence is a mere subject of a sentence, and does not refer to any object 
which is raining. “It” in that sentence does not stand for anything. It is a 
quack pronoun (Nkrumah 1964, 18). 
 
Nkrumah’s analysis leads him to conclude that due to the depth of solipsism to which 
Descartes descended, the “I” in “I think therefore I exist” is a quack pronoun that does not 
necessarily refer to an object, so that once again we have unattached experience - thinking 
without an object which thinks. Furthermore, since th  subject is merely grammatical, the 
universe becomes a plurality of thoughts that are unattached (Nkrumah 1964, 18). 
 
For Nkrumah, it is more normal to found idealism on some theory of perception, even 
though this leads to the conclusion that we can only k ow matter through perception, and 
this makes matter depend for its existence on percetion, and since perception is a 
function of the mind or spirit, matter ends up depending on spirit for its existence. 
However, Nkrumah points out that our bodies are elem nts in the external world. If body 
wins its existence from perceptual knowledge, it could not at the same time be the means 
to that knowledge. Body precedes perception. So the idea of perception through physical 
senses becomes incoherent in idealism (Nkrumah 1964, 16). This argument I can grant, 
since Berkeley’s esse est percipi (“to be is to be perceived”) is not indispensable to 
proving that reality goes beyond matter. However, it is Nkrumah’s next argument, which 
is the same as that of William Amo, that earns my disagreement. 
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Nkrumah cites William Amo who argued that idealism is enmeshed in contradictions: 
The mind, for Amo and Nkrumah, was conceived by idealism as a pure, active, un-
extended substance, and ideas that constitute the world can only exist inside the mind. 
Then, wonders Nkrumah and Amo (Nkrumah 1964, 18), how could ideas of physical 
extended objects, which must also be extended, subsist in the un-extended mind? Or could 
it be that the mind itself would have to be extended in order to receive such ideas? 
Nkrumah notes that the contradiction is in the denial of the spatial nature of the mind and 
the compulsion to harbour spatial objects in it. In idealism it is not only our bodies that 
are tucked away in our minds, instead of the other way round, but the entire universe as 
well (Nkrumah 1964, 19). 
 
The error of Nkrumah and Amo is in supposing that an idea of an extended object must 
also be extended: there is no warrant for this supposition. To begin with, the idea of an 
object cannot be the object that it is representing, so there is no bridge to infer from the 
extended nature of an object to an extended nature in an idea regarding it. Even the 
concept of images or shadows will make this clear: xtended objects give rise to shadows 
and images, but these shadows and images are not extend d like the objects that give rise 
to them. 
 
Rejecting idealism whilst asserting the compatibiliy of materialism and theism presents 
further problems for Nkrumah’s materialism. He has argued that idealism fosters theism1 
and that materialism and theism are quite compatible (Nkrumah 1964, 84). So Alexander 
Wooten (1990, 49-55) explicates the contradiction as follows: if theism depends on 
idealism, and materialism and idealism are as antithetical as Nkrumah presents them to 
be, then we must question if Nkrumah’s philosophical m terialism is really a materialist 
philosophy (if we want to take seriously his argument that materialism and theism are 
compatible). 
 
                                               
1 See the “God-complex” argument in Nkrumah 1964, 19. 
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On the whole, Nkrumah seems to have thought it necessary to dislodge the concept of 
idealism regarding perception, in order to pave wayfor his materialism or his doctrine of 
the primary reality of matter. Nevertheless, there se ms to be no need at all for this, since 
the fact that matter can exist unperceived does not in any way prove that it is the primary 
reality. For one thing, Nkrumah fails to explain why e thinks there is any relationship 
between the two issues - the perception of matter and its alleged superiority. Thus 
Nkrumah’s treatment of idealism seems to be a misfired or unwarranted section of his 
overall metaphysics. 
 
Matter and Categorial2 Convertibility 
Nkrumah proceeds to distinguish between sole reality nd primary reality of matter, 
quantity and quality, non-consciousness and (self) consciousness, mass and energy 
(Nkrumah 1964, 20). He asserts that matter can change from one to the other of these 
categories through what he refers to as “categorial conversion”. According to him, “By 
categorial conversion, I mean such a thing as the em rgence of self-consciousness from 
that which is not self-consciousness; such a thing as the emergence of mind from matter, 
of quality from quantity” (Nkrumah 1964, 20). He argues that philosophy is only called 
upon to show the possibility of such a conversion, not to trace its details, which is up to 
science (Nkrumah 1964, 20). 
 
Nkrumah argues that philosophy can show the possibility of categorial conversion in one 
of two ways, namely, by conceptual analysis or by pointing to a model. He begins here by 
arguing that considering the primary reality of matter, other categories can be said to arise 
from matter through process, and that it is at thispoint that philosophical materialism 
becomes dialectical (Nkrumah 1964, 21). He thinks that he problems of all the ancient 
philosophers - Thales’s water, Anaximander’s Boundless, etc. - were all problems of 
categorial conversion: 
Presently, philosophy addresses the issue of categorial c nversion through 
two branches of knowledge: logic and science. Logic addresses this issue 
through three concepts: nominalism, constructionism and reductionism. 
                                               
2 It is not “categorical” but “categorial”. 
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The model of categorial conversion can be found in sc ence, for in science 
we can see that matter and energy are two distinct but not unconnected or 
irreducible categories. And in chemical change physical quantities give 
rise to emergent qualities (Nkrumah 1964, 21). 
 
In the three concepts - nominalism, constructionism and materialist reductionism - one 
category is primary in reality, and other categories arise or are reducible ultimately to it. 
Furthermore, for every proposition about an item that is in a derivative category, there 
must be a corresponding proposition about one in the primary category, such that the 
proposition in the derivative category cannot be true unless that in the primary category 
were true. For example, if one says that matter is the primary category, then every other 
category, including spirit, to the extent that it is recognized as a category, is a derivative 
category. So in order that propositions about spirit can make sense, there must be matter. 
In fact for Nkrumah, “Even when propositions about spirit make sense, in order that they 
should be true, certain propositions about matter ne d to be true” (Nkrumah 1964, 22). 
 
In constructionism, as Nkrumah elaborates, concepts which are proper to derivative 
categories are built using as raw materials concepts which are proper to primary 
categories. Reductionism holds only as applicable items or concepts in derivative 
categories that are directly reducible to ones in pr mary categories. In nominalism, only 
concrete existences are held to be real; others are ur ogates of these concrete existences 
on a higher logical plane (Nkrumah 1964, 22). In the same way, according to Nkrumah, 
philosophical materialism recognizes the differences b tween consciousness and non-
consciousness, quality and quantity, mind and matter, energy and mass, but treats these 
differences as belonging to logical grammar. Nkrumah compares these differences to the 
difference drawn by Frege between concepts and objects, such as when he (Frege) said 
that “the concept ‘horse’ is not a concept but an object” (Nkrumah 1964, 23). 
 
Nkrumah gives an example: when a man is asked to take an inventory of objects in a 
room, he does not go about making a list of flat tops and legs on the one hand and tables 
and chairs on the other: 
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In the same way, we may admit epistemological differences between mind 
and brain, quality and quantity, energy and mass, without accepting any 
metaphysical differences between them; without admitting in other words 
that for mind one needs any more than a brain in a certain critical 
condition; for quality any more than a certain dispo ition of quantity; for 
energy any more than mass in a certain critical state (Nkrumah 1964, 23). 
 
Metaphysically, argues Nkrumah, philosophical materi lism accepts mind or 
consciousness only as a derivative of matter. Quality is a surrogate of quantitative 
disposition of matter: it can be altered by altering quantitative dispositions of matter. 
Mind is a result of critical organizations of matter. Nervous organization has to attain a 
certain minimum of complexity for the display of intelligent activity, or the presence of 
mind. The presence of mind and the attainment of this critical minimum organization of 
matter are one and the same thing. Energy too is a critical quantitative process of matter: 
Mind is nothing but the upshot of matter with critical nervous 
arrangement. The equivalence intended is a material one, not a defining or 
formal one. That is to say that propositions about minds, qualities, energy, 
are reducible without residue to propositions about body, quantity and 
mass; the former propositions could not make sense unl ss the latter 
propositions were sometimes true. As it were, mind, quality, energy, are 
metaphysical adjectives (Nkrumah 1964, 24). 
 
In philosophy of mind, the above argument is referrd to as the Doctrine of Emergence, 
or Emergentism. Emergentism generally holds that there is one substance with two 
properties: the physical and the mental. When the physical properties are arranged in a 
certain manner, mental properties will emerge. There a e two types of emergentism. 
Strong emergentism argues that mental properties, once emerged, are no longer reducible 
to physical ones, but weak emergentism argues that they are (see Chalmers 2006). Thus 
while strong emergentism makes allowance for the exist nce of consciousness, weak 
emergentism cannot afford to recognize consciousness, pecially if consciousness is 
interpreted as a phenomenon that cannot be reduced to physical nature. Nevertheless, both 
types of emergentism share the same basic belief, namely, that extra-physical properties 
emerged from physical ones. 
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Let me offer a brief evaluation of the concept of categorial convertibility at this point. It 
will be recalled that Nkrumah’s point is that categories that are not material, such as 
categories that are spiritual, can emerge from matter through categorial conversion. 
Nkrumah hopes by this theory to reconcile the spiritual universe with the material 
universe, on condition that the material one remains primary and the spiritual one 
becomes a derivation from the primary one. Thus if, for instance, we are to consider God 
(who is spiritual) in relation to the material world (which comes first), Nkrumah’s 
categorial convertibility places God as a derivation f the material world, while the 
material world becomes the primary category of exist nce which can give rise to other 
categories, including God. 
 
In this respect we can now ask the question: Why did Nkrumah repeatedly avoid 
discussing the subject of God, insisting on discussing “spirit”, when it is obvious that the 
most important subject parallel to his materialism  the question of the existence of God? 
We could say that Nkrumah’s attempted shrewdness on this issue is deliberate since he 
did not want to be seen to deny the existence of God in affirming materialism. 
 
Moreover, the analogy of categorial convertibility that Nkrumah took from science is 
incorrect. Recall that he wrote: 
For philosophy’s model of categorial conversion, it turns to science. 
Matter and energy are two distinct, but as science has shown, not 
unconnected or irreducible, categories. The inter-reducibility of matter and 
energy offers a model for categorial conversion. And another model is 
given in the distinction between physical change and chemical change, for 
in chemical change physical quantities give rise to emergent qualities 
(Nkrumah 1964, 24). 
 
The above quotation from Nkrumah shows that he regards energy as quality and matter as 
quantity. Yet quality has no place in science, for in science energy is calculated as a 
quantity. For instance, the energy inside an inflated balloon is calculated in terms of 
pressure as the volume of air molecules that is preent in the balloon: it has nothing to do 
with quality, neither is it a quality of anything els . Similarly, chemical change does not 
give rise to qualities, but to quantities. When hydrogen is mixed with oxygen, it does not 
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give rise to a new quality, but rather to a new andequally measurable quantity, which is 
water. The chemical change from hydrogen to water is measured as quantity. Here the 
notion of “quality”, especially as distinct from quantity, seems to be out of place. 
 
Nkrumah had singled out nominalism, constructionism and materialist reductionism as 
concepts in logic that recognize the reducibility of c ncepts in a secondary category to 
concepts in a primary category, in such a way that statements about the former would not 
make sense unless statements about the latter made sens . The comparison that Nkrumah 
made between his materialism and these concepts would have been plausible, except that 
he did not single out what categories of being the concepts apply to, or whether they 
apply at all to categories of being and not to epist mological concepts. If, in line with the 
formal concern of Logic to which they belong, they apply to epistemological concepts, 
there is no material ground to bring them into discourses of being. Epistemologically, a 
voluminous theory is reducible to (that is, can be designated by) a word, but it cannot be 
inferred from this that spirit is reducible to matter. 
 
Let me recall Nkrumah’s remark that when a man is asked to take an inventory of objects 
in a room, he does not go about making a list of flat tops and legs on the one hand and 
tables and chairs on the other; in the same way, we may admit epistemological 
differences between mind and brain, quality and quantity, energy and mass, without 
accepting any metaphysical differences between them (Nkrumah 1964, 23). However, by 
the analysis already made, the differences between th se are metaphysical as well as 
epistemological. 
 
Metaphysically, Nkrumah accepts mind or consciousnes  only as derivative of matter. For 
him, quality is a surrogate of quantitative dispositi n of matter: it can be altered by 
altering quantitative dispositions of matter. It remains fundamental that mind and 
consciousness are not material concepts. Nevertheless, energy is a material concept and is 
regarded as a quantitative commodity by science. Thus, from the basis of both science 
and logic, none of Nkrumah’s submissions has been able to show how non-material 
categories of being are reducible to matter. 
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Since Nkrumah believes (in line with reductionism) that items in a derivative category are 
reducible to items in a primary category, we can see him as a weak emergentist. Thus for 
him items in a derivative category not only emerge from, but are also reducible to, items 
in a primary category. Yet this raises a basic problem with his theory: if items in the 
derivative category are reducible to items in the primary category, then it means that spirit 
is reducible to matter, just as spirit emerged from matter. This is a further step in reducing 
the ontological status of items in a derivative category to items in a primary category. It is 
consistent with thoroughgoing materialism, and drops much of the pretensions that it 
makes to extra-sensible reality. It is worth pondering if Nkrumah thought of this; but 
whether he did or not, it almost totally eliminates he whole question of the existence of 
items in a derivative category. This is so because if it ms in a derivative category not only 
emerge from, but are reducible to, items in a primay category, then we might want to 
consider if items in the derivative category were ev r items at all, or simply side-effects 
or echoes of items in the primary category. 
 
Matter and Dialectical Change 
Nkrumah explains that the difference between philosophical materialism and 
constructionism/reductionism/nominalism is that the former can explain categorial 
convertibility while the latter cannot (Nkrumah 1964, 24). For him, apart from 
philosophical materialism, it is only in the philosophy of mathematics that conditions are 
given for a categorial leap in the generation of numbers. For philosophical materialism, 
the world consists not of states but of processes, not of things but of facts. On the other 
hand, constructionism, reductionism and nominalism all stop at the logical basis of 
categorial conversion: they ascertain only that conversion is possible. However, when 
materialism becomes dialectical, it ensures the material basis of categorial conversion. 
Thus dialectical change is the description that explains the process of categorial 
conversion. Nkrumah goes further: “Dialectical change in matter is that which serves as 
ground to the possibility of the evolution of kinds. The evolution of a kind is the loss of a 
set of old properties and the acquisition of a new s t through the dialectical movement of 
matter” (Nkrumah 1964, 25). To say, therefore, that mind, quality or energy arises from 
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or is reducible to matter is neither to say that mind has mass, or that quality has mass or 
that energy has mass. Rather, it is to say that these categories can arise from or are 
reducible to matter by dialectical change through categorial conversion. 
 
For Nkrumah, dialectic is that which makes evolution of all kinds possible, and it is the 
ground for the evolution of mind from matter, of quality from quantity, of energy from 
mass. This kind of emergence, since it depends on a critical organization of matter, 
represents a leap. Nkrumah explains why he believes this is so: 
When a crisis results in an advance, it is in its nature to perpetrate a leap. 
And the solution of a crisis always represents a discontinuity. Just as in the 
foundations of mathematics, critical numbers represent a break in 
continuity in the evolution of numbers, so in nature does the emergence of 
quality from quantity represent a break in the continui y of a quantitative 
process (Nkrumah 1964, 26). 
 
Nkrumah holds that dialectical evolution of any kind cannot be conceived as linear, 
continuous and mono-directional. For him, evolution conceived in such a way cannot 
explain the transformation of one kind into another, fo  it represents only an accumulation 
of phenomena of the same sort: 
Linear evolution is incompatible with the evolution f kinds, because the 
evolution of kinds represents a linear discontinuity. In dialectical 
evolution, progress is not linear, but goes from one plane to another. It is 
through this kind of leap from one plane to another that new kinds are 
produced and mind can emerge from matter (Nkrumah 1964, 26). 
 
At this point, I will attempt some response to Nkrumah’s proposal about the capability of 
matter for dialectical change. In doing this, let me take a little cue from someone. 
According to Geoffrey Hunt, Nkrumah’s philosophy is actually un-dialectic despite its 
supposed incorporation of “dialectic” which he claims distinguishes it from vulgar 
reductionist materialism; for while Marx’s dialectical method organically makes use of 
the “active” moment of idealism, Nkrumah, as we have seen, rejects idealism out of hand. 
The problem then becomes how materialism can become dial ctical when Marx’s 
introduction of dialectic reconciles and overcomes both materialism and idealism. Hunt 
argues that a “materialism made dialectical” is as perplexing as Hegel’s idealistic 
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dialectic which Marx refuted. He reminds us that Marx did not intend to flee one 
metaphysics to fall into another. Whereas Nkrumah’s consciencism described matter as 
“absolute and independent”, Marx made no separate teatment of “matter”, but rather a 
dialectical method in which there is a “passive moment” (which corresponds to 
Nkrumah’s hypostatized matter). Hunt concludes thata “materialism made dialectical” 
would assume a purely physical “opposition” which could only be mechanical and not 
dialectical (Hunt 1980, 4). 
 
Hunt goes on to argue that Nkrumah is quite confused regarding dialectics: he presents 
“dialectic of thought” alongside “dialectic of nature” and “dialectic of society”. Dialectic 
becomes a general way of describing any two entities that “oppose” one another or appear 
merely different, and consequently “dialectic” loses some value as a methodology. We 
also find Nkrumah speaking not only of dialectic betw en “positive” and “negative” 
action, but also of dialectic between “a belief in a transcendental world and sensible 
world” (Hunt 1980, 13). It is not certain that all this is any more meaningful than the 
principles that “everything moves in a circle” or tha  “love pervades the universe” 
suggested by certain mystical doctrines (Hunt 1980, 13). 
 
Although Hunt’s second criticism about Nkrumah’s general use of dialectics might seem 
harsh (and exaggerated), it makes a point regarding Nkrumah’s application of dialectics 
in a way that he (Nkrumah) finds convenient to explain the emergence of spirit from 
matter. Hegel clearly describes the dialectic of ideas and events, while Marx describes the 
dialectic of material conditions, but Nkrumah goes further to tell us that spirit can emerge 
from matter through dialectics. Instead of explaining how this could be the case, he says 
that it is up to science to do so; but how could Nkrumah discern what explanations 
science will (or should) provide, if, being a meta-physicist, he does not yet know it? 
 
When Nkrumah says that dialectics involves “… the loss of a set of old properties and the 
acquisition of a new set …” (Nkrumah 1964, 25), he introduces further difficulties into 
his proposal. Applied to his claim regarding the emergence of consciousness or spirit 
from matter, we can ask: what is lost in matter for c nsciousness or spirit to emerge? It 
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will not make sense to say either that matter itself i  ost (since the universe cannot be 
without matter), or to say that a part of matter is lost (which will make matter less of itself 
and mean that consciousness or spirit took on some asp ct or bit of matter). 
 
Matter and Self-Motion 
Matter, for Nkrumah, is a plenum of forces that are in antithesis to one another. It is thus 
endowed with powers of self-motion (Nkrumah 1964, 79). To begin this topic, Nkrumah 
alluded to diverse sorts of motion, the obvious onebeing change of place, and another 
kind of motion which consists in the alteration of property (Nkrumah 1964, 80). He noted 
that some philosophers have interpreted the inertia of matter to mean the inertness of 
matter, that is, that matter is incapable of intellectual as well as physical activity, 
implying a kind of “stupidity” of matter. However, Nkrumah believes that they contradict 
themselves, and cites John Locke to prove his case: 
For instance John Locke in his The Essay on Human Understanding, denies that matter is 
active and attributes all activity to spirit. But he says in his theory of perception that 
corpuscles travel from a perceived object to our appro riate organ of sense in order that 
we should be able to perceive it. These corpuscles ar  said by him to be part of the 
perceived object which detach themselves and subject us to a kind of radiative 
bombardment. Here, Locke patently contradicts himself. For this activity of matter is not 
said by him to be induced, but original, natural (Nkrumah 1964, 81). 
 
Nkrumah’s error in this analysis is that corpuscles, a  described here above by John 
Locke, do not constitute matter, but sense data; and sense data, as far as is 
epistemologically known, are not material objects. 
 
The reason that Nkrumah gives for self-motion is that matter is a plenum of forces that 
are in antithesis to one another. However, he does not explain how matter comes to 
contain antithetical forces, what the relation of antithesis in matter is, or how this 
antithetical activity in matter could lead to self-motion. He argues that even the theory of 
gravity explains the current motion of bodies, how and why they keep moving, but that it 
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is silent over the issue of antecedents to motion (Nkrumah 1964, 81). He adds that all 
those who uphold the big bang theory of the universe - that the universe started as a 
super-atom whose internal stresses multiplied untilit was caused to burst asunder - imply 
that matter has powers of self-motion, because they do not consider this big bang in terms 
of externally impressed forces (Nkrumah 1964, 81-82). However, the scientific theory (I 
call it hypothesis) of big bang - that the universe started as a super-atom whose internal 
stresses multiplied until it was caused to burst asunder - remains, in my view, a scientific 
guess because none of its proponents lived long enough backwards to witness the event, 
neither is there sufficient scientific warrant to sub tantiate the hypothesis into a theory. 
 
Nkrumah contends that even the phenomenon of radiation nd the wave mechanics of 
quantum theory presuppose that bodies have powers of self-motion even in that sense 
which requires something other than change of property (Nkrumah 1964, 82). If matter 
perpetrates emission of particles then there is motion, and to the extent that this emission 
is spontaneous, then there is self-motion. Nkrumah adds that we also witness day after 
day the overt and obtrusive phenomenon of spontaneous motion in living beings 
(Nkrumah 1964, 82). 
 
By the wave mechanics of quantum theory, Nkrumah refers to Heisenberg’s principle 
which states that it is impossible to predict where a subatomic particle is and how fast it is 
moving at any given moment (Heisenberg 1962). However, I see a problem with invoking 
quantum mechanics to support material self-motion: Heisenberg’s principle does not deal 
with causality, but rather with predictability. Heis nberg maintained that the movement of 
subatomic particles was unpredictable and immeasurable; he did not maintain that their 
movement was uncaused or self-caused. As such, I do not see how this conclusion about 
self-motion could be made on Heisenberg’s behalf. 
 
The other category of beings to which Nkrumah ascribes self-motion are living beings 
(Nkrumah 1964, 82). This is in line with Thomas Aquinas for whom only living beings 
with consciousness are capable of self-motion (Aquinas 1959, lect. 1, n. 219; lect. 5, n. 
285). Nevertheless, Nkrumah introduces some vulnerability to his proposal here: it can be 
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argued that living beings possess self-motion precisely by reason of the activity of a 
principle that is absent in non-living beings, and this would give Nkrumah a fresh 
challenge of demonstrating that such a principle is also present in non living things. 
 
According to Nkrumah, if anyone wishes to maintain the philosophical inertness of 
matter, he or she must ascribe self-motion to some non-material principle, usually soul or 
spirit, which will inhere in matter or externally impress it. However, as Nkrumah argues, 
even if it is said that there is a spirit or soul responsible for self-motion in matter, it will 
not have been said that in every case of the motion f a body there must be a presumed 
spirit or soul concealed in the body, a ghost lurking in the machine .3 Hence inertness of 
matter cannot be achieved by the mere postulate of spirit or soul (Nkrumah 1964, 82). 
 
Nkrumah’s argument above is fallacious on at least three counts. First, Aristotelian 
metaphysics regards matter as a given and form as adefining principle. This is the 
doctrine of hylomorphism. This categorization assumes that matter is inert and its form is 
externally impressed. To oppose this, Nkrumah would need to demonstrate how matter 
adds form to itself without external agency. Second, the inertness of matter is the 
foundation of science. The first of Newton’s three laws of motion states that if an object 
is at rest, it will remain at rest, or if it is moving along a straight line with uniform motion 
it will continue to keep moving unless an external force is applied on it to change its 
existing state (italics mine).4 This is known as the Law of Inertia, which states that any 
possible motion of an object requires external compulsion, and directly denies Nkrumah’s 
separation of inertia from inertness. Third, the inertness of matter is compatible with the 
existence of God and the spiritual. This is because inertness implies that matter relies 
ultimately on external agency for its motion and form (as we see from the Law of Inertia 
and Hylomorphism), and unless contrary clarification s provided, for its origin. What is 
more, self-motion in matter contradicts the creative principle attributed to the Supreme 
Being, as it implies that the universe originated from matter rather than from Him. 
                                               
3 This is a term coined by Gilbert Ryle to describe Rene Descartes’ mind-body dualism. Ryle (1949) argues 
that it is absurd to think that there is a non-physical mind in a physical body when the mode of 
interaction between the two is not known, or is speculative. 
4 See Newton’s first law at: http://csep10.phys.utk.edu/astr161/lect/history/newton3laws.html. 
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Nkrumah considered another objection to his theory of the self motion of matter, which, 
he remarked, has over impressed philosophers, namely, th  idea of intention (Nkrumah 
1964, 82). It was thought that spontaneous motion could only be deliberate or purposeful. 
However, Nkrumah noted that deliberateness, purpose and intention are attributed only to 
living things, and not even to all living things at that. Matter, in itself non-living, was 
therefore denied deliberateness, purpose, intention. It was therefore incapable of 
spontaneous motion (Nkrumah 1964, 83). However, Nkrumah argues that self-motion of 
matter had engaged the attention of philosophers since ancient times. Thales had singled 
out water as the basic stuff and infused it with the principle of change, so that by the 
operation of that principle, a transmutation from what we now know as water to other 
things would be possible; but since everything is water, the principle would permit only 
geometric changes, that is, it must be limited to only the rarefaction or condensation of 
water. For this, the principle needed to be a principle of motion. Nkrumah notes that 
although Thales said that things were full of gods, he only meant to assert the capacity of 
matter for self-motion, that is, to reject its inertness (Nkrumah 1964, 83). It is his 
(Thales’) idiom, not his thought, which was picturesque. Nkrumah adds that just as 
Aristotle was later to recover the forms from Plato’s heaven and restore them to matter, so 
Thales was retrieving the source of motion and the cause of processes from the priests’ 
heaven for matter (Nkrumah 1964, 84). 
 
My objection to Nkrumah’s appeal to Thales’ theory f water is that Newton’s theory of 
motion was later to render all matter inert. Importantly, the whole world of technology 
has been built on the theory that matter, being inert, r quires external force for motion of 
any sort. This shows that the idea of the inertness of matter is correct. 
 
Furthermore, the Ionian project of identifying the basic stuff of existence proved 
unsuccessful. At the very least, no one would presently think that everything consisted of 
water, or fire, or air, etc. Nkrumah noted that Aristotle recovered the forms from Plato’s 
heaven and restored them to matter. Yet the same Aristotle, in his doctrine of 
hylomorphism (Aristotle 2008, 194b23-194a8), denies matter of self-motion by arguing 
that it needs form, a defining principle, without which it is presumably inert. The very 
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notion of form considered as a separate concept from matter denies matter of self-motion, 
dialectics and categorial convertibility. 
 
According to Nkrumah, matter is not inert, but has inertia (Nkrumah 1964, 84). Inertia 
and inertness have been sufficiently distinguished. He explains that while inertness 
implies inertia, inertia does not imply inertness. However, from the foregoing analysis, 
inertia does imply inertness in matter. 
 
Conclusion 
Nkrumah’s metaphysics is fraught with contradictions. Can materialism avoid atheism? 
According to Engels’ analysis, this is not possible: any kind of materialism is 
incompatible with theism, since matter is made a prime crucible of existence. So there is a 
contradiction in Nkrumah’s claim to being “a non-denominational Christian and a 
Marxist socialist and I have found no contradiction between the two” (Nkrumah 1971, 
12). Secondly, Nkrumah rejects idealism out of hand, and argues that matter is dialectical; 
but how can matter alone be dialectical? Thirdly, the analogy of categorial convertibility 
that Nkrumah took from science is incorrect. The int r-reducibility of energy and matter 
does not offer any model for the inter-reducibility of spirit and matter. In the absence of 
any other proof, any other instance of categorial conversion, including from capitalism to 
socialism, is inapplicable. The reason Nkrumah gives for self-motion is that matter is a 
plenum of forces that are in antithesis to one another. However, he does not explain how 
this antithetical activity in matter could lead to self-motion, or even how matter comes to 
contain antithetical forces. Besides, contrary to his arguments, matter is inert. 
 
What informs Nkrumah’s overall adoption of materialism? It is that the Marxist-Leninist 
ideology favours matter as the unifying factor of equality. He states clearly that idealism 
is “connected with a tiered society …” and that “through its mode of explaining nature 
and social phenomena by reference to spirit, idealism favours a class structure of a 
horizontal sort, in which one class sat on the neck of another” (Nkrumah 1964, 75). 
Materialism, on the other hand is “connected with a humanist organization … through its 
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being monistic, and its referring all natural process s to matter and its laws, it inspired an 
egalitarian organization of society. The unity and fundamental identity of nature suggests 
the unity and fundamental identity of man and society. Idealism favours an oligarchy, 
materialism favours an egalitarianism” (Nkrumah 1964, 75). Yet apart from the fact that 
the rejection of idealism implies a rejection of the theism that Nkrumah tries to 
accommodate, there is no framework (and Nkrumah offers none) for inferring from the 
unity of matter to the equality of men. Neither Nkrumah nor his Marxist mentors 
attempted to demonstrate such a connection. Reality seems to suggest the contrary: 
everything else apart from putative matter, as long as it is in a flux, produces inequalities 
of energy, motion, size and so on. A doctrine of the equality of humans will surely not 
rely on a unity of matter, since this will more logically imply the equality of everything 
that is matter, from animals to inanimate objects. A doctrine of the equality of humans 
will need to rely on a rather workable first premise, uch as the fact of shared identity as a 
biological species. 
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